The voting advice given to users is also inherently limited: VAAs mostly disregard accountability, salience, competence and non-policy factors; they treat parties and not outcomes as paramount; and they can be subject to strategic manipulation by political parties. As recommended by their designers, voters should treat these applications as tools and guides rather than as stringent recommendations.
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parliamentary elections the conversion rate was just three per cent, but a surprisingly high 15 per cent of the surveyed VAA users said that they did not have a favourite candidate and voted for the candidate suggested by a VAA (Mykkänen et al., 2007: 5) .
While such self-reported assessments of VAA influence are of course of uncertain validity, VAAs are clearly exceedingly popular online tools to help voters gain political information and make decisions. As such, they may have a non-trivial impact on voting behaviour. This means that it is important to understand what kinds of recommendations In this paper, we therefore examine the model of voting that underlies these online applications. Specifically, we consider when they treat the preferences entered by voters as matching those of parties. By understanding what VAAs treat as voter-party congruence, we also clarify which model of voter representation underlies these applications. In doing so, we concentrate on proximity, directional, salience and valence models of vote choice. We find that VAAs reflect a view of party competition and voting that is largely based on issue-based proximity models. This means that parties are seen as congruent with voters if their ideological distance to each other is low, so voter representation is along the lines suggested by the responsible party model (APSA, 1950) .
Having established the dominant model of voting encoded in VAAs, we investigate whether the actual recommendations they give in fact follow the proximity logic as well.
Specifically, we analyse 13 VAAs from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland and compare party positions extracted from these applications with expert survey and manifesto data. We find that in general terms VAAs reflect party positions well, but that accuracy depends on the number of questions asked. This means that party-voter matches on secondary issues, which are represented by fewer VAA questions, are less exact. While Finnish researchers have used candidate preferences recorded in VAAs to study the ideology of MPs and voter-representative congruence (Paloheimo et al., 2005; Kestilä-Kekkonen and Wass, 2008; Reunanen and Suhonen, 2009) , this paper presents the first cross-national attempt to systematically study how voting advice applications match voters to parties.
After briefly describing how VAAs work, we consider the logic of voting and representation that underlies most VAAs, concentrating on proximity, directional, salience and valence models of issue voting. We then extract policy positions from VAAs and compare these to existing measures (expert surveys and party manifestos) to establish the accuracy of VAA party positions. The final section considers possible limitations in the way VAAs match voters to parties.
How VAAs match voters to parties
While VAAs in each country differ slightly, they all follow a basic model that is based on comparing parties' and voters' issue preferences. The central feature of every VAA is a multiple-choice questionnaire, usually containing 20 to 35 statements on current political issues or more general political questions. Users are asked to provide their opinions on each of these statements and after completing the questionnaire are shown how closely their views match with those of the parties. The general format of VAAs is thus not very different from questionnaires in popular magazines that, for example, claim to uncover your personality type.
Despite these significant similarities, VAAs nevertheless differ in key ways. This is best illustrated by presenting the sample of thirteen VAAs from seven countries for which we have collected detailed information and party placements ( Second, these providers differ in how they choose statements and how they established party positions on each of these statements. As with any survey, the choice of question items and their phrasing affect the final results (Walgrave et al., 2009) . While providers could potentially skew the recommendations made by the application, most appear genuinely keen to produce balanced applications. During the statement selection process, VAA providers tend to study the public discourse as reflected in the media and consult the general public, academics or journalists. Statements used as basis of comparison usually cover the most important policy areas.
VAAs also differ in how they establish the positions taken by parties and candidates on the various statements. To enable comparison between users' and parties' preferences, the 6 VAA provider must construct a party or candidate position database. Developers can either ask parties or their candidates to respond to a questionnaire or search party manifestos, party websites and press releases, newspaper reports and other material for parties' issue positions.
To prevent parties from abusing the application by entering inaccurate or untrue responses, some VAA providers require parties to provide evidence for their chosen position while others simply give them the option of justifying a response.
There are of course dangers to direct party involvement in this process. In Finland, for example, some candidates placed themselves in the middle of the response scale on all statements, thus capturing voters from both sides of the political spectrum (O. Ainola, personal interview, 23 February 2009). Having been exposed and ridiculed in the media for having "no opinions", these candidates were later forced to change their responses to be more substantial. Again in Finland, there is evidence that parties and candidates to manipulate their response to ensure that their profile matches the maximum number of users (see Kauppinen, 2007: 141) . In sum, there are inherent difficulties in how parties should be involved in the VAA design process. Kieskompas asked users to respond to the following statement: "The use of soft drugs should be legalised." The response options ranged on a 5-point scale from "completely agree" to "completely disagree", with an additional "no comment" option if the user wanted to ignore that particular question.
Finally, VAAs differ in whether they allow users and parties to express issue importance by weighting individual statements or themes consisting of several questions. Of our sample, only four do not include salience at all. Another five VAAs just let users select those statements or policy areas that are of particular importance to them, for example the Dutch Stemwijzer. The Austrian Wahlkabine and Politikkabine go furthest in allowing voters to assign personal salience to issues.
VAA recommendations and issue-based voter representation
The advice VAAs give is based overwhelmingly (and usually only) on the issue-based congruence between voters and parties. 1 In other words, the VAAs elicit the preferences of voters on a given set of issues and then based on these calculate a party recommendation. Yet there are various perspectives on how party policies can match those of voters: citizens can make use of issues in different ways in deciding how to vote.
The three best-known models are the proximity, directional and salience models. Thus, voters may prefer parties that are close to them ideologically (proximity model); parties that are on the same side as them on key issues and that hold these views intensely (directional model); or parties that focus on the issues they care about most (salience model). Each of these three models is a separate way in which a party may be 'congruent' with a voter, and we will examine the extent to which each is implemented in VAAs.
The recommendations of VAAs are calculated primarily by matching the policy positions of voters and parties. In doing so, VAAs could use either a proximity or a directional logic. A proximity logic would mean that recommendations are based on voterparty distances, usually measured on a continuous scale (Downs, 1957) . In contrast, a directional logic would be indicated by three features: each issue has two 'sides', for and against; it is possible to express intensity of preference; and parties are not generally punished for preferences more intense than those of voters (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989 This differs from the directional approach in two important respects. First, parties are not rewarded if they are more extreme (or hold their views more intensely) than the voter.
Under the directional logic a voter would not generally penalise a party for holding more intense preferences than him or her unless the party is outside the 'region of acceptability' (Rabinowitz et al., 1991) . However, VAAs tend to assign fewer points to a party as soon as the agreement on an issue is not perfect, no matter in which direction the disagreement exists.
Second, in VAAs that offer more than just 'yes' and 'no' as response options, there is no 'side' to issues. This means that being on the same side of an issue as the user does not yield a better rating for a party than being on the other side of the issue. For example, using a 4-point Likert scale a user might say that she 'agrees somewhat' with a certain statement. By these VAAs, she is seen as equally distant from a party that 'agrees completely' and one that 'disagrees somewhat'. Each party then receives the same amount of points towards the final matching score. 4 There is thus undeniably a strong proximity-based logic underlying the way that
VAAs match voters to parties. However, the fact that the response alternatives are generally very limited in number, with a maximum of five choices available, means that voter preferences are not measured on a true 'interval-level' scale. Indeed, as we have seen many
VAAs even restrict the choices to simple binary options. Here, VAAs may be closer to the directional approach, under which simple Euclidean distances are in any case not the key to understanding a voter's decision-making process (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) . Instead, it is argued that most of the time voters do not even have clear issue positions but rather have diffuse preferences and tend to simply side with one camp of a policy debate. Expressing such preferences is generally possible in VAAs: in all applications we examine users can choose one side of the debate. Some VAAs (e.g. the German Wahl-O-Mat) also offer a 'neither agree nor disagree' option, which fits the directional logic by providing a position of no preference.
The proximity logic would include the median position between the extremes of preference instead. However, while VAAs do not perfectly fit either the proximity or the directional model, the underlying logic of these applications is nevertheless closer to Downsian proximity model as it is fundamentally the degree of agreement, i.e. issue proximity, that determines the outcome of the matching process and thus the recommendation given to voters.
Do VAAs also take into account the importance a party accords to an issue? Salience theory suggests that parties compete not by taking different positions on the same issues but by stressing those issues on which they have a positional advantage (Budge and Farlie, 1983) .
Similarly, congruence can also be conceived of as the extent to which the priorities and agendas of voters and parties align (Jones and Baumgartner 2004) . Accordingly, voters might be expected to choose parties partly because they address the issues that concern them, for example the environment or immigration, regardless of the specific positions the party holds.
A second possibility is that voters weight positional distances based on the personal salience of each issue, so issue importance can also form part of the standard proximity model.
As noted above, most VAAs, for example the Dutch Stemwijzer and applications related to it (e.g. Wahlkabine in Austria and the German Wahl-o-Mat), allow voters to increase the weight of topics and statements that they consider to be of special importance to them. The weighting is incorporated into the distance calculation, for instance by doubling the effect of a statement marked as important and halving it for those selected as not important.
Nevertheless, issue salience is not part of all VAAs. Moreover, the applications generally ask users to assign salience in one of the last screens shown to the user (e.g. Stemwijzer, Wahl-OMat). Users may pay less attention to assigning salience in that case. In interviews, VAA providers also report that the many users do not use the weighting option when it is available.
Moreover, VAAs do not allow parties and candidates to concentrate only on issues on which they take popular positions and de-emphasise those issues where they take positions with less public approval. Thus, while VAAs do not disregard salience altogether, it is an aspect of issues that clearly plays a subordinate role to positions, and in therefore VAAs cannot be said to follow a salience logic of vote choice. Instead, it is more accurate to say that the applications allow for issue distances to be weighted in a way compatible with the proximity model. (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2007) . We coded the placements from the thirteen VAAs in seven countries listed in Table 1 and compared these with the general left-right measures as well as more specific policy scales.
We begin by comparing left-right scores extracted from VAAs with the three established measures. This broad comparison is appropriate because left-right summary dimensions exist in all countries where parties compete on policies (McDonald and Budge, 2005) . Moreover, extracting left-right scores allows us to make use of all the available questions in VAAs. 5 The left-right scores were calculated from the thirteen VAAs using multidimensional scaling (MDS). This procedure was chosen due to the low number of items in most of the VAAs and the low number of response alternatives (between two and five).
Using MDS also means that no assumptions need to be made concerning the policy content and direction of the questions included in the VAA: instead, the procedure provides an estimate of the overall relative party positions across all topics based only on the party answers to the VAA questions.
The precise steps used to extract left-right positions were as follows. The party positions on each question were coded numerically, with the specific coding depending on the response alternatives available in each VAA. 6 Then, metric multidimensional scaling was run on these coded positions. 7 Two dimensions were extracted using random starting points and fifty iterations. Scores were then recorded for the first dimension extracted; this is assumed to be the dimension that best summarises the positional relationships in party responses and should be most similar to a left-right summary dimension. Finally, the scores were standardised in order to make them more comparable cross-nationally; they were also reversed where necessary so that well-known left-wing parties are to the left on all extracted scales.
First, we present broad cross-national patterns of similarity between VAA-extracted and other measures of left-right position, following the approach used by Benoit and Laver (2007) . 8 Figure 1 plots the left-right scores from the VAAs and those from the two expert surveys and the manifestos. Given the close fit between VAA and expert survey party placements, it is not surprising that VAA scores and ranks match less well with manifesto estimates of party positions: it is wellestablished that CMP and expert survey left-right scores are highly but by no means perfectly correlated (McDonald, 2004; Benoit and Laver, 2007; Ray, 2007) .
13 Table 2 Generally, then, the measure of economic policy in VAAs is very similar to established measures. However, the VAAs with fewer than ten questions on economic policy matters tend to exhibit less impressive rank order correlations. The fewer the questions, the harder it appears to be to identify party ranks, at least if we take expert surveys as a credible benchmark. We also compared immigration and environment policy ranks with the two expert surveys. The detailed results are available from the authors; here, we restrict ourselves to a brief description of the key findings. Most importantly, we find that the ranks of several parties are often identical, so that in many countries the VAAs fail to distinguish the positions of different parties. On the immigration issue, the clearest such example is the 2008 Austrian Politikkabine, where all parties apart from the FPÖ are seen as having the identical policy position. In France, the PS and the PCF as well as the UMP and the MoDem are also seen as indistinguishable. The only VAA that really manages to separate parties on immigration policy is the Swiss smartvote, which asks 11 questions on this topic. Very similar findings also apply to the environment ranks extracted from the VAAs. In terms of guidance on secondary issue areas, VAAs are therefore relatively limited.
We can therefore conclude that VAA-extracted positions are more likely to be similar to established measures if a relatively large number of questions are asked on that topic. If expert surveys and manifesto data are accepted as a benchmark, the party positions encoded in
VAAs are largely accurate in terms of overall left-right and economic policy terms, but on secondary issues the relative limitations of the VAA design become apparent. Overall, though, it appears that VAAs do quite well at providing guidance on general issue-based congruence between parties and voters based on proximity assumptions.
Discussion and conclusion
VAAs match voters to parties mostly according to the proximity logic, the dominant issue-voting paradigm. While there are elements of the directional and salience models, recommendations are primarily structured around the degree of policy agreement between a party or candidate and the user. In this sense, VAAs can be said to reflect the responsible party model (APSA, 1950), as they help voters connect their policy preferences to those of internally cohesive parties. 15 VAAs therefore conceive of citizen representation as voter-party congruence on key policies.
Moreover, we find that VAAs encode party placements in accordance with the measures of policy positions commonly used by political scientists. This means that VAAs fulfil their aim of matching voters to parties well, especially if we focus on left-right congruence between voter and party positions. As a side benefit, the convergent validity of the VAA scores means that these could be used to provide election-specific party placement information, especially if the VAA is created by a trustworthy provider (for a similar argument, see Trechsel and Mair, 2011) .
However, VAAs are less able to establish clear party positions on issues that are less central to the political debate, as the detail and thus accuracy of party placements at least partly depends on the number of questions asked on each topic. This provides important recommendations for designers of VAAS. It is thus useful to provide as many questions as possible on the key policy areas of concern to voters. If voter-party congruence on the environment or immigration, for example, is a key factor, then more than one or two questions need to be asked. Obviously, VAAs are limited in how many questions they can include, but maybe users can be offered short and long versions, as has been done in the Swiss smartvote. Moreover, the number of questions should be larger when more parties need to be placed. In large party systems, more questions will be needed to effectively distinguish parties from each other.
Finally, VAAs focus on a specific type of voter-party link, namely through policies and opinions. This means that other forms of representation are disregarded: voters may have other concerns and other objectives in determining their vote choice than simple policy congruence. First, VAAs do not capture the extent to which voters want the party or candidate they vote for to be competent, yet this is important to citizens' electoral decision making (Stokes, 1963; Fiorina, 1981; Clarke et al., 2009) . 16 VAAs require their users to pass judgement on the desirability of a policy proposal, not assess whether a party is doing or would do a 'good job' in a specific area. Parties' competence on issues is not part of how voter representation is conceived of in VAAs. Yet accountability for past behaviour and the alternation of governments are also frequent and legitimate democratic concerns (Schumpeter, 1942; Manin et al., 1999 Of course, VAAs are limited in the extent to which they are able to include past performance, party competence and potential coalition agreements in their design. The fact that VAAs focus on ideological proximity is thus not a criticism of the role and impact of VAAs, which after all only claim to provide guidance on how well policy positions match those of voters. Yet, it is worth pointing out the difficulty of capturing complicated decision processes in relatively simple applications.
VAAs reflect a proximity-based logic of matching voters to parties and candidates, and based on our evidence they fulfil this logic well. By emphasising the role of policy agreement in vote choice, these relatively new applications may have an important effect on how voters think about politics and how they evaluate parties. For example, using VAAs may lead voters to depend more on policy positions and relative proximities when making vote decisions. As such a widely-used resource, VAAs may be able to provide an important insight into the complicated decision-making process of voting. Future research should make use of these opportunities. Note: For sources of VAA data, see Table 1 . Benoit and Laver data from Benoit and Laver (2006) ; 'Hooghe and Marks' data from Hooghe et al.
(2010); CMP data from Klingemann et al. (2007) . See text for details on how positions were extracted from the VAAs and the CMP data. Benoit and Laver (2006) ; CMP scores are 'vanilla' scores, see footnote 7; order of ranks reversed for Belgium, the Netherlands (Stemwijzer), Austria (Politikkabine) and Switzerland (Politarena). VAA coefficient=1.84, n=49. 11 In the case of the expert survey, this is perhaps not surprising: the providers of VAAs are in many ways themselves experts, so we would expect this similarity to exist. Moreover, some VAA providers explicitly make use of expert to help them place parties.
13
The VAA ranks are least similar to established measures in Belgium, Finland and
Switzerland. There are at least three potential explanations for this. First, the Swiss smartvote and the Finnish YLE VAA are both candidate-based applications. Some inaccuracy may stem from the need to take the average responses across all candidates in each party. Second, the inaccuracy of the Belgian VAA could reflect the fact that Belgium de facto has two party systems. The detailed party orderings in Table 3 show that many of the errors in the ranking stem from inversions across regional boundaries that will be of little importance to voters.
Finally, the inaccuracy of left-right placements may be due to the fact that the left-right dimension as a whole is less able to summarize party competition in Belgium and Switzerland, due to, for example, issues of regionalism and federalism.
14 The CMP ranks were calculated as follows. Using the manifesto closest to the VAA studied, the percentage of left-wing economic statements was subtracted from the percentage of right-wing economic statements. Based on these scores, the parties were than ranked from left to right. Left-wing economic categories are: per403 (market regulation: positive), per404 15 Candidate-centred VAAs (such as in Finland or Switzerland) are an exception to this.
16 Some Finnish VAAs form an exception to this general trend. They have included questions that ask the users to evaluate, for instance, how successful the incumbent president has been in carrying out her duties and which parties should form the next governing coalition. These
